A debate on the Atlantic world
Three points in favor of strong ties between the US and Europe
Last week I cross-posted a piece written by The Old Continent that attacked one of my prior articles, How to make transatlanticism cool again. He argued that even if one were able to make transatlanticism cool again, it’s a bad idea. Instead, he said that transatlanticism is a moot project that reflects the post-war weakness of European countries more so than any authentic relationship between Americans and Europeans.
Here’s a rejoinder to some of Jan’s points, and my attempt to argue again forcefully that for all of the pressures and forces against it, strengthening ties throughout the Atlantic world is much preferred to a transatlantic parting of ways.
Europe is still highly relevant to American foreign policy
Cultural ties are still exceptionally strong between the US and Europe
Transatlanticism can function without dependency
1) Europe is still relevant to American foreign policy
[T]hey governed a United States with fundamentally different geopolitical interests than those relevant in the 21st century. The United States didn’t just see the Soviet Union as a rival—it saw it as its most important rival on the planet… Yet today, the situation is exactly reversed, with China the most relevant adversary, while the conflict with Russia’s growing influence is seen by many as a mild annoyance at worst, rather than a true peer competitor.
Jan starts his attack on transatlanticism by making a simple argument: it’s irrelevant. The US once cared for Europe as a means to beat the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, China is America’s new geopolitical rival, making Europe moot. It’s a point made for over a decade, ever since the US began its “pivot to Asia.”
But in many ways, recent history has shown the exact opposite to be true. It’s Russia, not China, that continues to flex its muscle as a geopolitical adversary in the 21st century. American arms are going to fight Russians, not the Chinese. Russia under Putin has clear imperial ambitions that he has acted upon. China has those too, but hasn’t acted yet. To date, conflict between the US and China has been confined to a trade war. The US and the Russia are in a proxy conflict that in important ways mirrors the Cold War.
The defining military conflicts of the 2020s — the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza — so far have occurred in or on the peripheries of the European continent. While often rocky, the relationship between Europe and the US still has been critical to sustaining Ukraine’s war.
The trade flow between Europe and the US is also two-times greater than the trade flow between the US and China. As AI continues to scale, the European market will also be critical to American tech companies attempting to make extremely expensive capital investments profitable.
Plus, Europe is in the process of quickly rearming, with huge amounts of spending going into defense across the continent. Within 5-10 years, Europe could become a continent that is able and ready to flex its power beyond its own borders effectively. That would make Europe an important ally for the US, even if America continues to focus on China and its own hemisphere.
In short, Putin’s Russia is still an important geopolitical player, and Europe is still highly relevant to American interests. That’s a point in favor of transatlanticism, “Asia Pivot” or not.
2) Cultural ties are still strong between the US and Europe
But the strong Transatlantic ties which defined the post-war era only developed during this period precisely because geopolitical interests and shared civilizational heritage aligned.
I’ve argued that there are also strong cultural ties between the US and Europe. Jan argues that this too is not enough to keep the transatlantic relationship whole. If geopolitics and “civilizational heritage” don’t align, then the relationship will fall apart.
As an American living in Europe, I am routinely shocked by how deeply embedded American culture is here. This form of soft power has been resilient even in the face of political belligerency towards Europe and Europeans by the Trump administration.
Even if Jan is correct in his first premise, that Europe is no longer relevant to American interests, I think that cultural ties will still wed Europe and the US together. America has had long stages of isolationism before, such as throughout the 1930s. But that isolationism ended as soon as Europe was conquered by Hitler.
The public reaction in the US to Ukraine’s attack by Russia in February 2022 was extraordinary, and I don’t think it would have been very different even if Trump were in the White House. Americans went to go fight in Ukraine. Take into consideration that Ukraine is also on the European periphery. If Russia had attacked Europe directly, say Berlin or Warsaw, the cultural and public response from America would have been even more extraordinary.
In short, even in the age of Trump cultural ties are still incredibly strong between the US and Europe, which would allow the relationship to weather even a momentary lapse in aligned interests, as perhaps may be occurring now.
3) Transatlanticism can function without dependency
In addition to geostrategic issues, the relationship is also detrimental to both societies’ sense of self. What applies to individual persons also applies to nations: in order to have strong relations with others, one needs a clear understanding of oneself. Yet the Transatlantic relationship increasingly resembles a case of arrested development—Europe less a partner than a child unwilling to move out of their parents’ house, unable to imagine itself facing the challenges of an inhospitable and uncaring world on its own.
I think this is Jan’s most convincing argument — that the transatlantic relationship is bad for Europe and hampering the continent’s 21st century development. It’s an argument that numerous European voices attacking American dominance of the continent argue too. They say that the relationship is one-way, unbalanced, with the relationship defined by a flow from the US to Europe.
Largely, I agree with this criticism of transatlanticism. Europe has been hampered by America’s monolithic nature. But I don’t think European dependency on the Americans will be forever. In fact, the relationship between the two could quickly equalize within the next decade.
First, Trump has actually begun the process of disentangling the US from Europe. That will be good for Europe. By compelling NATO countries to increase defense spending and his dismissiveness toward European allies, Trump has jumpstarted a process of rearming and reflection that will strengthen Europe in the medium- to long-term.
Second, the EU is in the midst of a push to strengthen European competitiveness and technological growth. (Albeit to so far varying levels of success.) Member states are pouring more resources into defense that will spillover into the rest of the economy, and concerns about the EU’s slow response to international threats is opening the possibility for more radical reforms of the EU’s fundamental structure. That’s a change that’s coming from within Europe.
Third, due to the developing AI bubble, the US economy is actually in a much more risk-averse position than Europe. With a strengthening Euro and weakening American economic policymaking, Europe could see it’s economic relationship with the US change drastically.
Europe can exist independently of the US and stay engaged in the transatlantic relationship at the same time. Transatlanticism can work without an American dependency on Europe.
In the wake of Obama, American media and public opinion has been dominated by narcissistic, isolationist messaging and thinking that portray America’s relationship with the rest of the world as a zero-sum game.
That’s incredibly short-sighted, not only for America’s erstwhile allies in Europe and around the world, but for America itself.
For centuries, the Atlantic space has defined America’s relationship with the rest of the world. As new political thinkers explore what post-Trump politics looks like, it’s critical that they make the transatlantic relationship central to their thinking.